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I present a theory of development in which heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs require
credit to start new projects and open new sectors. As the variety of sectors expands during
development, the allocation of entrepreneurial talent improves. A key result of the paper
is to show that, in addition to increasing the average productivity of the matches between
agents and sectors, this process also mitigates informational frictions a⁄ecting the functioning
of ￿nancial markets. Furthermore, the positive impact of sectoral variety on the e¢ ciency
of ￿nancial markets gives rise to a novel feedback between ￿nancial development and R&D
e⁄ort, which may lead to di⁄erent types of dynamics. A successful economy typically exhibits
a progressive increase in the variety of sectors, which in turn helps to alleviate frictions in the
￿nancial markets. However, a poverty trap may also arise. This situation is characterised
by a rudimentary productive structure with poor matching of skills to activities, and where
the operation of ￿nancial markets is severely a⁄ected by talent mismatching.
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11 Introduction
Over the course of development, the variety of productive activities in the economy tends to
increase in conjunction with the aggregate stock of capital and output. This observation implies
that economic development manifests itself partly as a process of sectoral diversi￿cation and
increasing specialisation within the economy, an idea that dates back to Adam Smith (1776) in
his discussion of the division of labour and its relation with the size of the market (The Wealth
of Nations, chapter 3). Such a dynamic pattern is also described by Allyn Young (1928, p. 537),
who writes "industrial di⁄erentiation has been and remains the type of change characteristically
associated with the growth of production." Similarly, Landes (1969, p. 5) argues that the most
evident e⁄ects brought about by the Industrial Revolution were the gains in productivity and
the increase in the variety of products and occupations.
I propose a theory in which this process of sectoral diversi￿cation helps to mitigate informa-
tional frictions a⁄ecting the operation of ￿nancial markets. Furthermore, the degree of sectoral
variety is itself endogenous to the theory, and it is positively in￿ uenced by the e¢ ciency of ￿nan-
cial markets. As a result, sectoral di⁄erentiation and the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial markets appear
interrelated in the model, and this positive interaction becomes a fundamental ingredient that
shapes the patterns of development followed by di⁄erent economies.
The paper studies the evolution of an economy populated by heterogeneously talented in-
dividuals. In particular, individuals are characterised by distinct comparative advantages con-
cerning entrepreneurial activities. A key assumption is that entrepreneurial skills are private
information. In such a context, when agents need credit to start up their projects, asymmet-
ric information gives rise to an adverse selection problem linked to the allocation of skills and
prevents the e¢ cient operation of ￿nancial markets.
The modelled economy is constituted by di⁄erent productive sectors. Each of these sectors
represents a particular industry or activity, and requires the application of some speci￿c types of
entrepreneurial skills. The appearance of new sectors is assumed to be the result of R&D e⁄ort
and innovations. This assumption re￿ ects the idea that carrying out new productive activities
requires ￿rst an increase in the stock of knowledge in the society.
The central point in this paper rests on the hypothesis that sectoral variety facilitates the
self-selection of talents to sectors. This fact reduces the severity of the adverse selection problem
in the credit market, enabling the provision of more satisfactory credit contracts, which fosters
entrepreneurial investment. The impact of sectoral variety on credit market e¢ ciency, in turn,
2gives rise to a novel positive feedback between ￿nancial development and innovation activities.
Entrepreneurs are the agents who put innovations into practice in the economy. This means
that the level of entrepreneurial investment is what ultimately determines the size of the market
for innovations and the returns to R&D e⁄ort. As a result, better operation of ￿nancial markets
spurs the incentives to undertake R&D (by fostering entrepreneurial investment) and, at the
same time, higher investment in R&D contributes to ￿nancial development (by expanding the
variety of sectors in the economy).
Based on this setup, I present two main ￿ndings. First, there is a static e¢ ciency result
related to the degree of sectoral diversi￿cation: a larger variety of sectors helps reduce the
informational frictions in the credit market. In particular, given the heterogeneity of skills,
sectoral variety allows better matching of agents to activities in the economy, which in turn raises
the quality of the pool of credit applicants. In that regard, adverse selection here stems from
an underlying problem of relative scarcity of sectors, because this hinders the e¢ cient sorting of
(unobservable) talents. When the variety of sectors is limited, a large number of agents have no
other choice but to specialise in activities for which they might not be exceptionally talented.
Asymmetric information concerning skills, in turn, spreads the negative consequences of talent
mismatching to other sectors in the economy, since it prevents the e¢ cient (ex-ante) screening
of heterogeneous agents in the credit market. In other words, those agents who are not able to
exploit their comparative advantages in￿ ict a negative externality (through the adverse selection
problem) on those who, in principle, could exercise fully their intrinsic skills.
Second, from a dynamic perspective, the paper shows that some economies might follow
successful development paths, while others might get trapped in an underdevelopment equi-
librium. In the former case, development is characterised by a continuous process of sectoral
di⁄erentiation. In addition, alongside development, the allocation of talent improves and ￿-
nancial institutions become increasingly e¢ cient, as adverse selection problems tend to vanish
concomitantly with sectoral diversi￿cation. On the other hand, in the poverty trap, economies
exhibit a rudimentary productive structure, with few active industries, poor allocation of tal-
ents and highly ine¢ cient ￿nancial institutions. In that sense, the poverty trap is the result of
a general organisational failure in the economy, leading to the collapse of several markets.
The paper mostly contributes to two main strands of literature. First, it adds a novel
mechanism to the literature on ￿nancial market imperfections and poverty, which started with
Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993).1 These articles stress the in￿ uence of
1Other important papers in this literature include: Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Lloyds-Ellis
3wealth distribution on the dynamic behaviour of the economy when agency costs lead to credit
rationing. This paper provides a fully micro-founded explanation of why agency costs may
arise in a developing economy. Furthermore, the model is able to generate dynamics whereby
these agency costs decline as an economy develops. As a result, rationing is not just solved
because people become rich enough (so that they can a⁄ord better credit or insurance contracts),
but mainly because ￿nancial markets￿operation itself becomes more e¢ cient as development
progresses.
Related to this literature, the idea that credit markets￿e¢ ciency might be in￿ uenced by
agents￿payo⁄s in other markets of the economy has been suggested by De Meza and Webb
(2000) with a model in which payo⁄s are exogenously set. Ghatak, Morelli and Sj￿str￿m (2007)
build on this idea, and they explicitly endogenise agents￿payo⁄s, exploiting an interesting general
equilibrium interaction between the credit market and the labour market. When the economy
is able to provide high wages, low-quality entrepreneurs ￿nd themselves better o⁄ selling their
labour in the market. As a result, high wages help to "clean" the pool of credit applicants,
reducing informational frictions and enabling better operation of the credit market.
I study the sorting of talents within a multi-sectoral endogenous growth model. Innovation
and the creation of new productive activities thus become key features of the model, since
they lead to improved sorting of skills to sectors. Two main novel ￿ndings result from my
model compared to Ghatak et al. First, it shows that innovation improves the assignment
of skills, which in turn feeds back on innovation by increasing the returns to R&D. Second, it
highlights a new role for the innovation process, very di⁄erent from the one traditionally stressed
in the growth literature. Innovations are not only desirable because they directly augment the
productivity of inputs. They are also desirable because they help to mitigate frictions hindering
the operation of ￿nancial markets. From that perspective, this paper is also contributing to the
literature on sectoral variety and growth by proposing an additional channel whereby increased
variety promotes development.2
and Bernhardt (2000), Mookherjee and Ray (2002), and Ghatak and Jiang (2002).
2Sectoral di⁄erentiation has traditionally been considered to raise aggregate productivity by two distinct
channels: 1) permitting the exploitation of economies of scale through increasing specialisation (e.g., Smith
(1776), Young (1928), Romer (1990), Yang and Borland (1991), Jones(2008)); 2) enabling heterogeneously skilled
agents to obtain a better match (e.g., Rosen (1978), Miller (1984), Kim (1989)). The contribution of this paper to
that literature is then to show that sectoral di⁄erentiation brings about an additional positive e⁄ect on growth via
improved matching, because an increasing variety of activities helps to lessen adverse selection problems linked
to the allocation of skills.
4The second main strand of literature to which this paper contributes is that on growth and
￿nancial deepening. Within that literature, the two most related papers to mine are Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997, 1999).3 In the former paper, they construct a model with technological
indivisibilities in which the degree of market incompleteness tends to disappear with capital
accumulation, and this fosters ￿nancial development (in particular, it improves risk sharing).
Financial markets are enhanced by sectoral di⁄erentiation, because it allows better pooling of
sector-speci￿c shocks. The key novelty of my model with respect to theirs is that ￿nancial
development is the consequence of the alleviation of agency costs due to improvements in the
sorting of skills in a context of asymmetric information. In the latter paper, Acemoglu and
Zilibotti study the evolution of informational asymmetries and agents￿performances over the
development path. However, they focus on how a society manages to provide correct incentives
to agents, and how incentives become more e⁄ective as an economy grows. My paper studies
a di⁄erent problem, that is how the allocation of heterogeneous skills evolves during develop-
ment and, more importantly, it incorporates innovation decisions into the model, allowing for
endogenous variety expansion.
Section 2 describes the basic setup of the model. Section 3 studies the static equilibrium of
the economy; in particular it analyses the entrepreneurs￿optimal choice in the presence of adverse
selection. Section 4 introduces the innovation activities into the model, which endogenises the
variety of sectors in the economy. Section 5 proceeds to the dynamic analysis of this economy.
Section 6 discusses an important extension to the basic model. Section 7 presents and discusses
some stylised facts observed in cross-country data which are consistent with the main predictions
of the model. Section 8 concludes. Omitted proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Environment
The paper considers a small economy enjoying full access to international ￿nancial markets. Life
evolves over a discrete-time in￿nite horizon t = f0;1;:::;1g. In each period t a single-period
lived continuum of agents with mass normalised to 2 is alive.
The economy contains a continuum of sectors indexed by the letter i 2 [0;1]. Each sector
i represents a particular industry where a ￿nal good is produced. The set of sectors [0;1] is
constant over time; however, not all sectors are necessarily active at any moment in time. In
3Other papers in that literature with some connection to mine are Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and
Saint-Paul (1992).
5particular, at time t only a fraction nt of all sectors are able to enjoy the activity of productive
industries. Hereafter, At ￿ [0;1] will denote the set of sectors with active industries at time t.
The set At has Lesbegue measure nt.
The availability of productive industries is the result of innovations (either generated during
the past or in the present). This assumption re￿ ects the idea that in order to produce a new
type of good, we ￿rst need to create the knowledge required to produce this new good. Once the
industrial activity that corresponds to sector i is created by an innovation, it never disappears
(i.e., if sector i 2 At, then sector i 2 At+￿ 8￿ ￿ 0). To ease notation, henceforth I skip the
use of time-subscripts when creating no confusion. Sectors belonging to A will be referred to as
active sectors (and the remaining sectors will accordingly be called inactive sectors).
A sector i 2 A provides the agents in the economy the chance to invest in an entrepreneurial
project called Project-i. The return of Project-i is random, subject to an idiosyncratic shock.
Project-i￿ s return also depends on the application of some speci￿c entrepreneurial skills, and on
the amount of capital invested in the project. A full description of Project-i is provided in the
following subsection (equations (1) and (2) ahead in the text).
Each generation comprises two di⁄erent groups of individuals, each one with unit mass:
1. Entrepreneurs: These agents are endowed with entrepreneurial skills which, are needed to
organise and undertake the production of ￿nal goods.
2. Inventors: They carry out R&D in order to generate new ideas that can be used by the
entrepreneurs in the production of new ￿nal goods.4
2.1 Entrepreneurs
At any time t, there exists a continuum of (prospective) entrepreneurs who are indexed by the
letter i 2 [0;1]. Henceforth, the entrepreneur i will be referred to as the type i.
The cohort-t of entrepreneurs is alive during period t. A new cohort is born just at the end of
the previous cohort￿ s lifespan. Each (dying) entrepreneur procreates one (new) entrepreneur. For
the moment, I assume agents are non-altruistic and are born with zero initial wealth (in Section
4To illustrate this distinction, take the Pharmaceutical Industry as an example. The innovator would be
represented by a biochemist whose task consists in designing a formula to produce a new drug. On the other
hand, the pharmaceutical company would represent the entrepreneur. This agent organises the production process
of the drug and takes it to the market, turning the (abstract) formula into a ￿nal good ready for consumption.
66 this assumption is relaxed). All entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, sharing identical preferences
over consumption. Accordingly, they all seek to maximise their expected consumption.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to their entrepreneurial skills. More precisely,
if type j 2 [0;1] invests k units of capital in Project-i 2 A, then his Project-i￿ s gross return
(yi;j) is given by:
yi;j = ￿i;j f(ki;j):
The function f(k) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable, and
satis￿es Inada conditions. The variable ki;j represents the amount of capital invested in Project-i
by type j. Capital fully depreciates during the process of production. Finally, ￿i;j denotes the






1 with probability pi;j
0 with probability 1 ￿ pi;j;
where,
pi;j = 1 for all i;j 2 [0;1] if j = i;
pi;j = p 2 (0;1) for all i;j 2 [0;1] if j 6= i:
In short, type i is an agent with intrinsic comparative advantage in Project-i.5 Gross returns of
Project-i are thus given by:





f(ki;j) with probability p
0 with probability 1 ￿ p
, where j 6= i (2)
Diversi￿cation among entrepreneurial projects is not feasible. In other words, agents must
specialise in, at most, one particular Project-i 2 A.
Concerning the informational structure in the economy, entrepreneurial types are assumed
private information. Project outcomes, on the contrary, are publicly observable. In addition
to that, I assume types are intergenerationally uncorrelated, implying that parents￿historical
outcomes provide no information whatsoever about the type of a child.
Lastly, I assume that everybody has access to a "backyard" activity which requires no initial
investment and yields net return equal to v with certainty. Without loss of generality, I set v = 0
(implying that the corresponding participation constraint will never bind).6
5The concept of comparative advantage is de￿ned in terms of average productivity (the average productivity
of type i in Project-i is higher than the average productivity of type j 6= i in Project-i).
6If v > 0, agents would have access to an outside option with positive payo⁄, hence their participation constraint
72.2 Inventors
In addition to the entrepreneurs, in any period t, there is also a continuum of agents with unit
mass (the inventors) who are born with the particular skill to be able to produce new ideas. New
ideas, in turn, materialise in innovations and expand the set of active sectors in the economy in
period t, At. This means that the set At is the result of the stock of innovations generated during
the history of the economy up to t: The presentation of the inventors￿optimisation problem will
be postponed until Section 4.
2.3 Credit Markets
Since agents in the economy are born with zero wealth, they will need to rely on credit markets
in order to undertake their investment projects. The rest of the world will provide local agents
with the needed funds. All credit market transactions with the rest of the world are mediated by
some ￿rms called ￿nancial intermediaries. The local credit market is characterised by free-entry
and absence of set-up or sunk costs. Since the economy is small and there is perfect international
capital mobility, ￿nancial intermediaries are able to draw liquid funds from international credit
markets facing a perfectly elastic supply at the international (net) interest rate Rf. In the sake
of algebraic simplicity, let Rf = 0.
Financiers will o⁄er loan contracts stipulating the payment to be made to them, conditional
on the outcome of the entrepreneurial project. Individuals in the economy are protected by
limited liability. As a result, since in the event of failure projects yield zero output, entrepreneurs
would be able to pay back a positive amount to the ￿nanciers only in the case of success.
Equilibrium loan contracts will thus display the following structure: (lj;rj) 2 R ￿ R, where lj
represents the loan extended to type j and rj stands for the (net) interest rate charged on lj in
the event of success. In other words, the entrepreneur j must pay back lj(1+rj) in the state of
success, while if the project fails he goes bankrupt and the ￿nancier recovers 0 income.7
may bind in equilibrium. This might have some minor implications on the type of credit contracts observed in
equilibrium, however, none of the main results and insights of the paper would be altered by letting v > 0.
7Nothing in the model would change if entrepreneurs raised capital by issuing equity, as each share will pay zero
in the event of failure and a strictly positive dividend in the event of success that is identical for all entrepreneurial
projects.
83 Static Equilibrium Analysis
Throughout this section the set of active sectors At is taken as exogenously given. Thus, the
paper focuses on the optimal behaviour of the entrepreneurs, and on the set of credit contracts
o⁄ered by the ￿nancial intermediaries, given At. This course of action will yield the equilibrium
solution of the model at some speci￿c period of time t. In the next sections I proceed to study
the dynamic evolution of the economy. This will require explicitly incorporating the inventors￿
optimisation problem, which endogenises the set At.
Let Ct denote the set of credit contracts o⁄ered by ￿nancial intermediaries in period t. An
entrepreneur j 2 [0;1] alive during t will choose an allocation [(rj;lj)￿;k￿
i;j : i 2 At], solving the
following two-stage optimisation problem:
￿ First-Stage (specialisation decision): j 2 [0;1] selects sector i 2 At in which to invest.
￿ Second-Stage (optimal investment in sector i):8
max
ki;j;(rj;lj)
: Ei(Uj) = pi;j maxf0; f(ki;j) ￿ (1 + rj)lj + (lj ￿ ki;j)g
+ (1 ￿ pi;j) maxf0; ￿(1 + rj)lj + (lj ￿ ki;j)g (I)
subject to: ki;j ￿ lj (budget constraint),
ki;j ￿ 0 (feasibility constraint),
(rj;lj) 2 Ct (set of o⁄ered credit contracts).
De￿nition 1 (Equilibrium at time t) Given the set At, an equilibrium at time t is a set of
entrepreneurial allocations [(rj;lj)￿;k￿
i;j : i 2 At]j2[0;1] and a set of o⁄ered credit contracts Ct,
such that the following two conditions are satis￿ed:
1) Entrepreneurs￿optimal allocation: Given the set Ct, 8j 2 [0;1] alive in period t, the
allocation [(rj;lj)￿;k￿
i;j : i 2 At] solves the two-stage optimisation problem (I).
2) Credit markets (competitive) equilibrium: (i) No credit contract belonging to Ct makes
negative expected pro￿ts; and (ii) there exists no other feasible credit contract z, such that z = 2
Ct, and which, if o⁄ered in addition to Ct, would make positive expected pro￿ts.
8Ei(Uj) denotes the expected utility of type j when he invests in Project-i (recall that the success probability
pi;j depends on the match between the type and the sector).
93.1 Credit Market Equilibrium Contracts
Following the literature on adverse selection in ￿nancial markets (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), Wilson (1977), and Milde and Riley (1988)), one would reasonably expect two di⁄erent
kinds of equilibria to possibly arise in this model￿ s credit market: 1) a pooling equilibrium,
in which all types receive an identical credit contract; 2) a separating equilibrium, in which
types are screened, receiving distinctive contracts which induce truthful self-revelation of their
(unobservable) skills.
Lemma 1 Assume the set of inactive sectors at time t is non-empty (i.e., At 6= [0;1]). Take
any sector i 2 At and any sector j = 2 At. Then, there can never exist an equilibrium at t in
which type i and type j are o⁄ered di⁄erent credit contracts.
Lemma 1 means that there cannot exist a separating equilibrium in this model. As a conse-
quence, if an equilibrium is to exist at all, it should entail pooling credit contracts. This result
stems from the conjunction of four di⁄erent assumptions: i) risk-neutrality, ii) the limited-
liability constraint, iii) agents being born with zero initial wealth (so they can place no collat-
eral), and iv) the fact that the outside option yields v = 0. Intuitively, given a set of credit
contracts, any contract that maximises net returns for (1) must also necessarily maximise ex-
pected net returns for (2) (since, in the presence of limited liability and no collateral, expected
net returns when (2) holds are proportional to net returns when (1) prevails).9
Given the set of active sectors at time t, At ￿ [0;1], we may split the population of entrepre-
neurs alive during t in two disjoint subsets: the ￿rst subset composed by all those types-i 2 [0;1],
such that sector i 2 At; the second one by all those types-j 2 [0;1], such that sector j = 2 At. The
￿rst group of agents would be able to exploit fully their comparative skills, whereas the second
one have to specialise in a sector for which they are not (exceptionally) talented. Abusing a bit
of the language utilised in the adverse selection literature, I will call the ￿rst group the good
types, while the second group will be denoted as the bad types.10
9See Ghatak, Morelli and Sj￿str￿m (2007), and also Gr￿ner (2003), for models that obtain pooling contracts
in a similar fashion. Pooling contracts are especially attractive in this context because they lead to a very neat
and smooth characterisation of the main results of this paper. Yet, pooling contracts, and in particular the
assumptions required for pooling to arise, are by no means crucial. What is essential here is the fact that as more
sectors become active and the matching of skills improves, the informational frictions in the credit market are
eased, which in turn permits the provision of credit contracts closer to the ￿rst-best contracts.
10More rigorously: good typest = fh 2 [0;1] jsector h 2 Atg and bad typest = fh 2 [0;1] jsector h = 2 Atg.
Notice that in this paper whether a particular Type-h 2 [0;1] is a good type or a bad type is not ￿xed, but it is
10In a pooling equilibrium, all entrepreneurs receive an identical credit contract (l;r). No-
tice then that Ct must comprise one single element; namely: Ct = (l;r). Additionally, in any
(competitive) pooling equilibrium, credit contracts must necessarily verify the following two
properties. First, the contract must make non-negative expected pro￿ts; otherwise this contract
would simply be withdrawn. Second, the contract must maximise the expected utility of the
good types; otherwise ￿nancial intermediaries could o⁄er a di⁄erent contract such that it makes
non-negative pro￿ts and, at the same time, it makes these agents better o⁄.
Assume for the moment that type i chooses to specialise in sector i 2 A (as it will be-
come clear later on, this will necessarily be true in equilibrium). Then, given Ct = (l;r), his
optimisation problem boils down to:
max
ki;i￿0
: maxf0; f(ki;i) ￿ (1 + r)l + (l ￿ ki;i)g (I￿ )
s:t : ki;i ￿ l (budget constraint).
Note now that because r ￿ 0 (otherwise ￿nanciers would make losses on entrepreneurial loans),
entrepreneurs will borrow only with the intention to invest in a project. As a consequence,
ki;i = l will hold in the optimum and Problem (I￿ ) will yield the following (standard) ￿rst-order
condition:
f0(k￿) = (1 + r) (3)
From (3), we can then obtain the optimal amount of capital invested in the project, given the
interest rate r. That is, k￿(r); where k0(r) < 0 since f00(￿) < 0. An equilibrium pooling contract
will, therefore, display the following structure: (l;r) = (k￿(r);r). (So that it maximises the
expected utility of the good types.)
3.2 The Equilibrium Interest Rate
The pair (k￿(r);r) characterises the equilibrium credit contract, given the interest rate r. There-
fore, in order to determine the exact credit contract that holds in t, it still remains to ￿nd the
equilibrium value of r in t. Let us denote this variable by r￿
t.
Consider sector i 2 At and suppose the type i alive in t decides to invest in Project-i. Then,
given r, his consumption (ci;i) would be determined by:
ci;i = f(k￿(r)) ￿ (1 + r)k￿(r): (4)
contingent of the set At. In that sense, from a dynamic point of view, everyone could eventually become a good
type, if the set of active sectors constantly expands over time.
11Now, suppose this type i chooses to invest in Project-x 2 At, where x 6= i. In that case, his
consumption (cx;i) would be given by cx;i = p[f(k￿(r)) ￿ (1 + r)k￿(r)]: It is then straightforward
that ci;i > cx;i, no matter the value of r. Hence, as long as sector i 2 At, this type i will specialise
in Project-i.
Consider now sector j = 2 At and the type j alive in period t. This agent could invest in any
Project-x, such that sector x 2 At, obtaining as expected consumption:
cx;j = p[f(k￿(r)) ￿ (1 + r)k￿(r)]: (5)
Since p > 0 the equation (5) yields cx;j > 0, irrespective of the value taken by r. This implies
that it will always be desirable for type j to invest k￿(r) in Project-x.
From the previous discussion, it follows that a fraction nt of the population of entrepreneurs
(the good types) will always pay back the ￿nancial intermediaries the agreed amount (1+r)k￿(r).
On the other hand, the remaining fraction 1￿nt (the bad types) will go bankrupt with probability
1 ￿ p. Being protected by limited-liability, the bad types are expected to pay back ￿nanciers
only the amount p(1 + r)k￿(r).
Perfect competition in the credit market naturally implies that ￿nanciers must make zero
pro￿ts in equilibrium. Then, the zero-pro￿t condition on entrepreneurial loans is given by:
nt (1 + r￿
t)k￿(r￿
t) + (1 ￿ nt)p(1 + r￿
t)k￿(r￿
t) = (1 + Rf)k￿(r￿
t) (where, recall that for algebraic
simplicity, Rf = 0 will be assumed).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium interest rate charged on credit contracts o⁄ered to entrepreneurs
is a decreasing function of the fraction of active sectors. More precisely,
r￿
t = r￿(nt) =
(1 ￿ nt)(1 ￿ p)
nt + (1 ￿ nt)p
: (6)
From (6), it can also be noted that: r￿(0) = (1 ￿ p)=p, r￿(1) = 0, and r00(nt) > 0.
Proposition 1 represents one the key insights of this paper. A larger number of active sectors
leads to a more e¢ cient operation of credit markets, because a higher value of nt improves the
sorting of entrepreneurial skills, alleviating the adverse selection problem in the credit market.
Intuitively, as the set At expands, a higher fraction of agents ￿nd it feasible to specialise in the
sector they are most talented at. This, in turn, reduces the average default rate in the economy,
enabling ￿nanciers to charge a lower interest rate on the loans they extend to entrepreneurs,
without incurring in expected losses.11
11Notice that r
￿ represents also the risk premium in the economy. In that regard, it is the risk premium on
entrepreneurial loans what diminishes as n goes up due to the better sorting of talent.
123.3 Entrepreneurial Consumption Level / Net Returns
Take again some type i 2 [0;1], such that sector i 2 A (a good-type representative). His con-
sumption level will be dictated by (4). Denote by Ug(r) the utility achieved by an entrepreneur
who belongs to the subset of good types. Di⁄erentiating (4) with respect to r, and taking (3)
into account, we get:
U0
g(r) = ￿k￿(r): (7)
Select now some type j 2 [0;1], such that sector j = 2 A (a bad types representative). His expected
consumption will be given by (5). Hence, letting Ub(r) denote the expected utility reached by a
bad type, we obtain:
U0
b(r) = ￿pk￿(r); (8)
where derivation of (8) also makes use of (3).
Lemma 2 Let ￿(r) ￿ Ug(r) ￿ Ub(r). Then, ￿(r) > 0 and ￿0(r) < 0, for all possible values r
may take in equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward from inspection of (7) and (8). The derivative
￿0(r) < 0 means that good types bene￿t from a fall in the interest rate r more than bad types
do. The reason for this result rests on the fact that good types never go bankrupt, thus they will
appropriate the full cost-reduction induced by a lower r. On the other hand, since bad types go
bankrupt with probability (1￿p), they will pro￿t from a smaller r only with probability p < 1.
Lemma 2 will play a key role in the inventors￿optimisation problem (in the following section).
4 Inventors, Market for Ideas, and Innovations
I model the appearance of new active sectors as the result of innovations. Following the En-
dogenous Growth Theory paradigm, innovations result from deliberate pro￿t-maximising R&D
policies undertaken by private agents which I refer to as inventors.12 I will focus only on hor-
izontal innovations, as those are the kind of innovations that will lead to improvements in the
allocation of agents￿talents, which is the key mechanism at work in this theory.
In each period t there is a continuum of single-period lived inventors with unit mass. Inven-
tors are non-altruistic and risk-neutral. Each (dying) inventor gives birth to a (new) inventor.
Inventors are able to generate new ideas (this is their speci￿c skill). Think of an idea as a
12E.g. Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992).
13blueprint or design, which contains the information needed to produce new types of goods. As
previously done with sectors and entrepreneurs, let inventors be indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Except for
their particular index i, all inventors within the same cohort are ex-ante identical. I suppose the
inventor i can only possibly innovate for sector i. Since vertical innovations are assumed away,
the subset of inventors who (would) innovate for sectors which were already active in period
t ￿ 1 will thus not play any relevant role during t.
In order to come up with a new idea, an inventor needs ￿rst to carry out R&D, which is
costly. A new idea, however, does not per se modify the technological frontier of the economy;
for that to happen, the idea must by applied by an entrepreneur.13 When the idea designed by
inventor i is put into practice by some entrepreneur j 2 [0;1], this idea becomes technology, and
materialises as Project-i (turning sector i into an active sector).
Technology is a pure public-good; that is, its use is non-rival and non-excludable. More pre-
cisely, once some particular entrepreneur j 2 [0;1] applies a new idea, the underlying knowledge
becomes readily (and instantly) available to all the other entrepreneurs from t onwards. On
the contrary, an idea is excludable, since the inventor who has generated it can keep his idea
undisclosed for as long as he wants, simply by not spelling it out to any other agent.
An inventor who comes up with a new idea, will then try to sell it to an entrepreneur. I
assume entrepreneurs pay the inventors after production takes place and that the transaction
between an inventor and an entrepreneur is not observable to the ￿nanciers. Given the public
nature of technology, only type i would be willing to pay a positive price to obtain the idea
generated by inventor i.14 To see this, recall from Lemma 2 that ￿(r) > 0 for any possible value
that r may take in equilibrium. This ￿(r) equals the increment in (expected) utility that the
type i would get by applying the idea generated by inventor i (were this idea given to him for
free!). Notice ￿(r) is a surplus resulting from a bilateral monopoly relationship between type
i and inventor i. In principle, the surplus ￿(r) could be distributed between the two parties
according to various rules. For simplicity, let the whole surplus ￿(r) be appropriated by the
13This complementarity between inventors and entrepreneurs is in line with the view of economic development
by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934, pp. 88-89); he writes, "Entrepreneurship must be distinguished from ￿ invention￿ .
As long as they are not carried out into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant. And to carry any
improvement into e⁄ect is a task entirely di⁄erent from the inventing of it, and requiring di⁄erent kinds of
aptitudes. Although entrepreneurs of course may be inventors, it would not be by nature of their function but by
coincidence."
14Notice that this, in turn, implies that inventors will not face any adverse selection problem in the market for
ideas, as they can be certain that only the correct types would be willing to buy their ideas.
14inventor, leaving the entrepreneur just indi⁄erent between buying or not the new idea (in other
words, assume the inventor makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o⁄er to the entrepreneur for the transfer
of the idea).15
4.1 Inventors￿Optimisation Problem
Inventors must expend e⁄ort in order to generate new ideas. E⁄ort generates disutility. Let
￿i;t denote the e⁄ort cost (measured in units of consumption) spent in R&D activities by the
inventor i alive during period t. Additionally, denote by Pr(Ii = 1) the probability that the
inventor i will generate a new idea. Consider sector i = 2 At￿1; the probability that inventor i
generates an idea for sector i in period t is given by (henceforth, I skip the use of time subscripts
on ￿i;t to ease notation):
Pr(Ii = 1) = ￿(￿i); (9)
where: ￿0(￿) > 0, ￿00(￿) < 0, ￿(0) = 0; lim
￿!1￿(￿) ￿ 1, and lim
￿!0
￿0(￿) is ￿nite.
Given that sector i = 2 At￿1, inventor i will choose the value of ￿i so as to maximise the
expected pro￿ts derived from the generation and sale of new ideas.16 Denote by
_
￿t the level
of R&D e⁄ort chosen by all the inventors belonging to the subset ￿A￿i
t￿1, where ￿A￿i
t￿1 = f
j 2 [0;1] j j 6= i and sector j = 2 At￿1g.17
Having managed to produce a new idea, inventor i will optimally charge a price ￿(r￿(nt))
when selling this idea to the type i. Notice that, assuming that all new ideas are sold to
entrepreneurs (which will be true in equilibrium), nt = nt￿1 + ￿(
_
￿t)(1 ￿ nt￿1).18 Hence, we
can rewrite ￿(r￿(nt)) = ￿(nt￿1;
_
￿t). Lemma 3 characterises the optimisation problem faced by
inventor i.





￿t) = ￿(￿i) ￿ ￿(nt￿1;
_
￿t) ￿ ￿i (II)
15Nonetheless, as long as it is assumed that the inventor￿ s income is increasing in the total surplus ￿(r), none
of the main ￿ndings of this paper would be a⁄ected if the entrepreneur could actually appropriate part of ￿(r)
(for instance, if the surplus were split following a Nash-bargaining rule).
16If sector i 2 At￿1, then the inventor i alive in t trivially chooses ￿i = 0.
17This
_




t ! [0;1), summarising the choice of ￿ for each inventor
belonging to ￿A
￿i
t . However, in the optimum, all these inventors will select the same value of ￿. Hence, a singleton
_
￿t turns out to be su¢ cient to represent their aggregate behaviour.
18This is because: 1) the sectors that were already active in t ￿ 1 remain active in t, and 2) a fraction ￿(
_
￿t)
among the inactive sectors in t ￿ 1 become active in t.
15Where the function ￿(nt￿1;
_
￿t) : [0;1] ￿ R+ ! R+ is increasing in both of its arguments. More
precisely: (i) ￿0
n(￿) > 0;8nt￿1 2 [0;1] and
_
￿t ￿ 0; and (ii.a) ￿0 _
￿(￿) > 0;8nt￿1 2 [0;1) and
_
￿t ￿ 0, (ii.b) ￿0 _
￿(￿) = 0 if nt￿1 = 1.
From Lemma 3 it follows that ￿i;t(￿i;nt￿1;
_
￿t) must be increasing in both nt￿1 and
_
￿t. To
grasp some intuition, notice that, since active sectors never revert to inactive, the higher nt￿1
is, the higher nt is expected to be. As a result, relatively high values of nt￿1 will tend to be
associated with relatively low levels of r￿
t (Proposition 1). This, in turn, implies that the surplus
generated by new innovations, ￿(r￿
t), is expected to be large (Lemma 2), allowing inventors to
charge a relatively high price for their ideas. Similarly, larger values of
_
￿t are also associated
with less severe adverse selection leading to lower r￿
t and higher ￿(r￿
t). In this case, the reason
is that a larger
_
￿t means more innovations will actually be produced, raising thus the value of
nt (from the given nt￿1). In addition to that, note ￿0 _
￿(￿) > 0 implies that there exists a positive
externality across inventors. This externality arises because when an inventor j 2 [0;1] comes
up with a new idea, this may turn sector j into an active sector, increasing the value of nt
(something which all inventors will bene￿t from).

























￿t) : [0;1]￿R+ ! R+,
and it exhibits the following two properties: 1) ￿￿
i(nt￿1;
_




￿t) is (weakly) increasing in
_
￿t.
Results in Proposition 2 are straightforward implications of Lemma 3 and equation (10).
Intuitively, as @￿i;t(￿)=@￿i is increasing in both nt￿1 and
_
￿t, larger values of these variables will
induce inventors to increase the optimal amount of e⁄ort spent in R&D.
The positive impact of nt￿1 on ￿￿
i represents the key result of this section. This feature
is the underlying force generating the novel positive feedback between ￿nancial development
and innovation activities proposed here. Essentially, a larger nt￿1 is associated with weaker
distortions in the credit market, thereby leading to higher entrepreneurial investment which
raises pro￿t to inventors. This induces higher R&D e⁄ort which, in turn, leads to a faster
rate of innovations, feeding back on nt. This positive feedback gives rise to the possibility of
non-ergodic dynamics in the model, as it will be discussed in detail in Section 5.
16For the remainder of the paper, it proves convenient to restrict the parameters con￿guration
such that the following two conditions hold:
Assumption 1. 9 ￿ n 2 (0;1); such that: ￿0(0)￿(￿ n;0) = 1.








Corollary 1 If Assumption 1 holds, then: (i) 8nt￿1 ￿ ￿ n :
_
￿t = 0 ) ￿￿
i = 0; (ii) 8nt￿1 > ￿ n :
￿￿
i > 0, regardless of the value taken by
_
￿t:
Corollary 2 If Assumption 2 holds, then: 8nt￿1 ￿ n : ￿￿
i = 0, regardless of the value taken by
_
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Figure 1: Optimal R&D e⁄ort as a function of nt￿1 and
_
￿t.
Figure 1 illustrates the results stated in Proposition 2. The left panel plots ￿￿
i against nt￿1,
given four di⁄erent values of
_








￿t, given ￿ve di⁄erent values of nt￿1 (nA < nB < ￿ n < nC < 1). Notice
that the notation in both panels is consistent with each other (i.e., the value
_
￿A in panel (a)
corresponds to the value
_
￿A in panel (b), and so on and so forth). Additionally, in Figure 1.b
(although not plotted) for nt￿1 = n we should have ￿￿
i(nt￿1;
_
￿t) = 0 for all values of
_
￿t. (The
45￿ line is just plotted for future reference.)
4.2 Inventors Nash Equilibrium Solution
Figure 1 characterises the result of the optimisation problem faced by inventor i alive in
period t when sector i = 2 At￿1, given nt￿1 and the (expected) behaviour of the other inventors.
17Nevertheless, I haven￿ t yet discussed whether inventors￿expectations, summarised by
_
￿t, are
indeed correct. In fact, expectations play an important role in the model because R&D e⁄ort
by a particular inventor exerts a positive externality on the others. More speci￿cally, as stated
in Proposition 2, the optimal policy of an inventor positively depends on the value of
_
￿t. As a
result, we must restrict the attention only to those solutions of Problem (II) which also represent
a Nash Equilibrium (NE) when we consider the whole set of inventors.
Given the structure of the model, any NE will be symmetric (SNE). The SNE are determined
by the intersections between the 45￿ line and the curves plotted in Figure 1.b. For some ranges
of nt￿1 2 (n;1), the model might lead to multiple SNE.19 Equilibrium multiplicity may arise
because inventors are subject to strategic complementarities (Cooper and John (1988)). Figure
2 shows two possible SNE schedules as a function of nt￿1 (only the SNE schedule for an inventor
i alive in t such that sector i = 2 At￿1 is plotted). In Figure 1.(b) and 2.(b) the parameters
con￿guration leads always (i.e., for all values of nt￿1) to unique SNE.20 On the other hand, in
Figure 2.(a) multiple equilibria emerge for values of nt￿1 2 (b n; ￿ n). Two equilibria are possible
in this case: one where ￿￿
t = 0, and another one in which ￿￿
t > 0. Bear in mind that, as it can be
deduced from Corollary 2, for any nt￿1 ￿ n, the SNE must necessarily be unique and encompass
￿￿
t = 0. Furthermore, for values of nt￿1 su¢ ciently close to 1, the SNE must also necessarily be
unique (since limn!1 ￿0 _
￿ = 0); but comprising ￿￿
t > 0 (because 0 < ￿ n < 1).
n
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Figure 3: Inventors￿Symmetric Nash Equilibrium.
19In what follows I restrict the analysis only to stable SNE though.









￿) < 1, 8n 2 [0;1] and
_
￿ ￿ 0.
Generally speaking, uniqueness requires innovators￿ external e⁄ects not to be too strong, so that the curves
plotted on Figure 1.b do not ever cross the 45
￿ line from below ￿see Cooper and John (1988).
18Remark. Since the optimal R&D e⁄ort is a function of the bilateral surplus, ￿(r￿
t), which has
been assumed to be fully appropriated by the inventor, all the previous results of this section




￿t) will remain unchanged if inventor i and entrepreneur i were in fact
the same agent. All that is needed in that case is to reinterpret ￿i;t as the R&D e⁄ort cost by
entrepreneur i alive in period t.
5 Aggregate Dynamic Analysis
The analysis in Section 3 has been conducted within a static framework (the set At was taken
as given). Section 4 provides the bridge between the static and the dynamic analysis of the
economy, since the inventors￿behaviour determines the evolution of the set At which, in turn,
dictates the exact equilibrium that holds at any time t according to De￿nition 1. In this section,
I present the dynamics of At. Since agents are born with zero initial wealth and all sectors are
(ex-ante) symmetric, nt turns out to be the only variable whose behaviour we need to study in
order to keep track of the dynamics of the economy.
De￿nition 2 (Dynamic Equilibrium) A dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of static equilib-
ria, linked together across time by the "law of motion" of nt speci￿ed in (11).
Law of Motion: nt = nt￿1 + ￿(￿￿
t)(1 ￿ nt￿1); (11)
where ￿￿
t denotes the R&D e⁄ort by inventor h 2 [0;1] alive in t when sector h = 2 At￿1, resulting
from the SNE in Section 4.2.
5.1 Stagnation vs. Development (Multiple Dynamic Equilibria)
This subsection investigates the characteristics of the dynamic paths followed by economies that
di⁄er in terms of their initial conditions. In particular, it studies whether economies that di⁄er
in terms of n0 may follow divergent dynamic paths, reaching di⁄erent long-run equilibria. For
this reason, I impose here the following condition on the parameters con￿guration (so that the
inventors￿SNE will always be unique, leading to a situation as the one in Figure 2.b).









￿) < 1, for all n 2 [0;1] and
_
￿ ￿ 0:
19Proposition 3 (Stagnation vs. Development) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then:
(i) Any economy that starts o⁄ with n0 ￿ ￿ n remains forever at n0 and displays no innovation
activities. That is, if n0 ￿ ￿ n, then: nt = n0 for all t ￿ 0, while ￿￿
t = 0 for all t > 0.
(ii) In any economy in which n0 > ￿ n, nt will continuously grow over time, converging monoton-
ically to n1 = 1.
Secular Stagnation: Take an economy for which n0 ￿ ￿ n. The equilibrium in t = 1 encompasses
￿￿
1 = 0. In addition to zero R&D e⁄ort and absence of innovations, this economy will exhibit
highly ine¢ cient credit provision and low levels of entrepreneurial investment. The credit market
ine¢ ciency is the consequence of severe adverse selection problems, which derive from the high
degree of sector incompleteness. On the other hand, repressed entrepreneurship is the result of
both lack of opportunities (few active sectors) and inadequate credit provision.
From (11), since ￿￿
1 = 0, then n1 = n0. This implies that ￿￿
2 = 0 will hold again at t = 2, in
turn leading to n2 = n1 = n0. Furthermore, in the absence of any substantial exogenous shock,
this stagnant equilibrium will perpetuate itself for all t 2 f0;1;:::1g.
Prosperity and Development: Consider now an economy in which n0 is large enough; more
speci￿cally, n0 > ￿ n. In this case, the equilibrium at t = 1 displays ￿￿
1 > 0. Intuitively, since n is
relatively large, the adverse selection problem does not become too serious, and the operation
of the economy does not turn out to be severely distorted (in particular, innovation activities
do not completely disappear).
From (11), ￿￿
1 > 0 implies that some additional sectors become active during t = 1. As a
result, n1 > n0 > ￿ n, and ￿￿
2 > ￿￿
1 > 0. Moreover, this prosperous dynamics will perpetuate ad
in￿nitum, and this economy will eventually reach a long-run equilibrium characterised by all sec-
tors being active (n1 = 1). During the transition period, the economy experiences development
and growth; this manifests itself as a process of progressive sectoral di⁄erentiation and better
sorting of entrepreneurial skills. At the same time, ￿nancial market operation concomitantly
improves, as adverse selection problems tend to vanish as nt rises.
5.2 History vs. Expectations (Multiple Static Equilibria)
Section 4.2 has shown that, within the range of nt￿1 2 (n;1), for some set of parameters
con￿gurations the model might display multiple SNE in the inventors game. As a particular
example, in Figure 2.a, for nt￿1 2 [^ n; ￿ n], where ^ n 2 (n; ￿ n), we ￿nd two possible (stable)
20SNE. Multiplicity of the inventors￿ SNE will lead to multiplicity of static equilibria in this
model. It is beyond the scope of this paper to study this sort of equilibrium multiplicity, as
the main intention here is to analyse how dynamic paths may depend on the initial conditions.
Nevertheless, I provide below a brief discussion of the equilibrium characteristics of an economy
whose parameters con￿guration leads to a situation as the one depicted in Figure 2.a.
When parameters in the model lead to a situation as the one plotted in Figure 2.a, then if
the value of n0 2 [^ n; ￿ n], this economy will be subject to multiple static equilibria. Equilibrium
multiplicity will be driven by inventors￿expectations. In particular, if expectations coordinate
in
_
￿1 = 0, then ￿￿
1 = 0 will prevail. Besides this "bad" equilibrium, we can observe that there










1 > 0. More importantly, from a dynamic perspective, whether expectations in t = 1 lead
to ￿￿
1 = 0 or ￿￿
1 > 0 may carry dramatic future consequences. Dynamically, ￿￿
1 = 0 entails that
nt stays stagnant during period t = 1; as a result, initial conditions in t = 2 would identically
replicate those faced in t = 1, with the economy still at risk of su⁄ering from coordination
failures. On the other hand, ￿￿
1 > 0 means that n1 > n0 and, consequently, this could possibly
shoot up n1 above ￿ n, and ignite a process of continuous prosperity and development thereafter.
For an economy with nt￿1 2 [^ n; ￿ n], the larger nt￿1 is, the higher the chances that nt > ￿ n will hold
if ￿￿
t > 0. Hence, within [^ n; ￿ n], both history and expectations matter in the sense of Krugman
(1991), and the economy might display periods of growth and technical change, followed by
periods of stagnation.
6 Incorporating Wealth into the Model
So far it has been supposed that all individuals are born with zero initial wealth. In many aspects
this assumption might seem far too extreme. Nevertheless, the zero initial wealth assumption
has allowed the model to completely isolate the impact of the fraction of active sectors on the
operation of the economy.
In this section, I let agents be born with positive initial wealth; furthermore, I allow initial
wealth to di⁄er across individuals of the same cohort. Individuals are warm-glow altruistic and,
accordingly, bequeath a fraction of their net life-time income to their o⁄spring (this bequest
will constitute the next generation￿ s initial wealth) ￿see Andreoni (1989). In short, this section
shows that none of the main results and insights presented earlier will be altered when we permit
agents￿initial wealth to be positive, stemming from parental bequests.
21Let wi;t denote the initial wealth of the type i alive in period t. Initial wealth is assumed
publicly observable, and is distributed in the population of entrepreneurs according to the cu-
mulative distribution function ￿t(w).21 Since types are assumed to be intergenerationally un-
correlated, then, in a steady state, initial wealth and types will turn out to be uncorrelated as
well (accordingly, the speci￿c value of wi;t will provide no information about the i￿ s type).
6.1 The Participation Constraint
When initial wealth is positive we need to take care of the participation constraint (PC) in the
credit market. In particular, when w > 0 a bad type might prefer not to engage in any credit
market transaction, and behave as if he were in complete autarky, since he may now invest a
positive amount of capital (k ￿ w) in a project, without the need to borrow.
Suppose a bad type with initial wealth w must choose his portfolio allocation in autarky. In
such case, he will solve:
max
0￿k￿w
: pf(k) + (w ￿ k):
This optimisation problem yields the following investment policies: i) k￿ = w if w ￿ k￿
B; ii)
k￿ = k￿
B if w > k￿
B. Where f0(k￿
B) = p￿1 (i.e., k￿
B is the bad types￿￿rst-best investment level).
Imagine now that this bad type decides to participate in the credit market. In this case, he
will invest k￿
P(r) units of capital in the project, paying an interest rate r on the borrowed amount
(k￿
P(r) ￿ w); where r corresponds to the interest rate that would hold in a pooling equilibrium.
The function k￿
P(r) stems form the ￿rst-order condition f0(k￿
P) = 1 + r; analogous to (3) in the
main model. Notice that 1 + r ￿ p￿1, hence k￿
P(r) ￿ k￿
B.
A bad type will participate in the credit market only if his PC is not violated; this requires
that: p[f(k￿
P(r)) ￿ (1 + r)(k￿
P(r) ￿ w)] ￿ pf(k￿
B)+(w￿k￿
B), for w > k￿
B.22 From this condition,
it follows that a he will participate in the credit market if and only if his initial wealth does not
surpass the threshold b w(r) 2 (k￿
B;k￿




B) ￿ (1 + r)k￿
P(r)] + k￿
B
1 ￿ p(1 + r)
:
21The presence of positive initial wealth will only a⁄ect the equilibrium in the economy through its e⁄ect on the
entrepreneurs. Accordingly, without any loss of generality, we can restrict the attention here only to the initial
wealth distribution among the population of entrepreneurs.
22The participation constraint also requires that: p[f(k
￿
P(r)) ￿ (1 + r)(k
￿
P(r) ￿ w)] ￿ pf(w), for all w ￿ k
￿
B.
Nevertheless, this last condition never binds.
226.2 The Incentive Compatibility Constraint
Take now an entrepreneur whose w ￿ b w(r). If he is a good type, he must get a separating credit
contract (paying an interest rate equal to Rf = 0), as no bad type with w ￿ b w(r) desires to
participate in the credit market at the (pooling) interest rate r. Despite that, a good type with
w ￿ b w(r) will not necessarily obtain a ￿rst-best credit contract. For this to happen, an equally
rich bad type should ￿nd no incentives to imitate the good-type ￿rst-best behaviour. Denote with
k￿
G the result deriving from the ￿rst-order condition f0(k￿
G) = 1; i.e., k￿
G designates the ￿rst-best
investment level of the good types. Notice that k￿
G ￿ k￿
P(r), because 1+r ￿ 1. A good type will
thus receive a ￿rst-best credit contract if and only if: p[f(k￿
G) ￿ (k￿
G ￿ w)] < pf(k￿
B)+(w￿k￿
B).
This last condition requires that his initial wealth is larger than the threshold e w 2 (b w(r);k￿
G);









What happens to a good type whose w 2 [b w(r); e w]? This agent will certainly receive a
separating contract. However, he won￿ t be able to get a ￿rst-best contract, as this would violate
the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) of the bad types with identical w. In fact, the IC
will bind for those entrepreneurs whose w 2 [b w(r); e w]. As a result, the credit contract received
by a good type with w 2 [b w(r); e w] stems from the following condition:
p[f(k￿
S) ￿ (k￿
S ￿ w)] = pf(k￿
B) + (w ￿ k￿
B): (12)
Equation (12) (implicitly) yields a function k￿






￿1 > 0, (ii) d2k￿
S=(dw)2 > 0, and (iii) limw!e w k￿
S(w) = k￿
G.
Table 1.A summarises the main features of the credit contracts o⁄ered to entrepreneurs.23
Table 1.A: Equilibrium Contracts (main features)
w < b w(r) w 2 [b w(r); e w] w > e w
type of credit contract pooling sub-optimal separating ￿rst-best separating




interest rate (on credit) 0 < r <
1￿p
p 0 0
23The underlying reason why richer agents receive more favourable credit contracts is the same as in the
literature on ￿nancial markets imperfections and poverty cited in the Introduction. Namely, since richer agents
have more of their own wealth at stake in the projects, their incentives are more closely aligned to those of lenders.
236.3 Entrepreneurial Consumption and Sketch of Dynamics
As in Section 3.3, denote by Ug (Ub) the expected utility level achieved by a good type (bad
type). When initial wealth is incorporated into the model, it will naturally be the case that
(expected) utility will depend on w as well ￿i.e., Ug = Ug(r;w) and Ub = Ub(r;w). Table 1.B
summarises how entrepreneurial expected utility depends on w (and r).
Table 1.B: Entrepreneurial Consumption ￿Ug(r;w) and Ub(r;w).
w < b w(r) w 2 [b w(r); e w] w > e w
good types f(k￿
P(r)) ￿ (1 + r)(k￿
P(r) ￿ w) f(k￿
S(w)) ￿(k￿




P(r)) ￿(1 + r)(k￿
P(r) ￿ w)] pf(k￿
B) +(w ￿ k￿
B) pf(k￿
B) + (w ￿ k￿
B)
From the results presented in Table 1.B, this lemma follows.
Lemma 4 Let ￿(r;w) ￿ Ug(r;w) ￿ Ub(r;w). Then: (i) ￿(￿) > 0, 8w;r ￿ 0; (ii) ￿0
r(￿) < 0,
8r ￿ 0 and w 2 [0; b w(r)]; (iii) a) ￿0
w(￿) > 0, 8w 2 [0; e w) and r ￿ 0; b) ￿0
w(￿) = 0, 8w ￿ e w.
Lemma 4 represents the counterpart of Lemma 2, when entrepreneurs start their lives with
positive wealth. On the one hand, Lemma 4 shows that Lemma 2￿ s key result ￿0
r(￿) < 0
holds as well when w > 0. On the other hand, it shows that the surplus ￿(￿) is (weakly)
increasing in w, which implies that richer entrepreneurs bene￿t from a larger nt more than
poorer entrepreneurs do. Furthermore, recall that the larger ￿(￿) is, the higher the incentives
for inventors to undertake R&D (Lemma 3 and Proposition 2). Therefore, ￿0
w(￿) > 0 entails that,
for a given value of nt ￿ which, following Proposition 1, will determine r￿(nt)￿ , the aggregate
distortions generated by the adverse selection problem in the credit market will become less
severe the wealthier the economy is. Figure 3 plots the surplus ￿(r;w) against w at four
di⁄erent values of r (namely: 1=p > rH > rL > 0), to illustrate Lemma 4.24
From a dynamic perspective, notice ￿nally that economies exhibiting a larger nt tend to be
richer as well. This is the case because the larger the fraction of active sectors, the higher the
average productivity in the economy. As a result, introducing wealth dynamics into the model
(by means of bequests, or any other reason that would still generate positive serial correlation in
wt) will not invalidate any of the main ￿ndings of this paper. In fact, as nt and wealth a⁄ect the
24Recall r = p
￿1 when n = 0; and r = 0 when n = 1. Additionally, notice b w
0(r) < 0, where lim





b w(r) = e w:
24economy￿ s performance in the same direction, the presence of bequests will actually reinforce
the dynamics previously discussed in Section 5.
Figure 3: ￿(r;w) against w at four di⁄erent levels of r.
6.4 Dynamics with Positive Bequests
Suppose preferences are given by Ui;t = c1￿￿
i;t b￿
i;t, where ci;t denotes the consumption of agent i
alive in t, bi;t represents the bequest left to his o⁄spring, and ￿ 2 (0;1). Given those preferences,
individuals will optimally bequeath a fraction ￿ of their lifetime income to their o⁄spring. The
amount bi;t will in turn fully determine the initial wealth of i￿ s son; i.e., wi;t+1 = bi;t. Henceforth,
we split the population of entrepreneurs in lineages indexed by the letter i 2 [0;1]. Since types
are intergenerationally uncorrelated, the initial wealth transition equations for any lineage i of
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B] with Pr = (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ nt)
if wi;t > e w
When w is linked across generations by bequests, the dynamics of the economy can no longer
be solely determined by the value of nt but also depend on the initial wealth distribution ￿t(w).
25In particular, the economy￿ s dynamic path is now dictated by the following system:
nt = nt￿1 + ￿(￿￿
t)(1 ￿ nt￿1) (13)












Remark. For this section we continue assuming that the NE of the inventors￿game is always
unique (or, alternatively, that coordination failures, even if possible, do not arise). Accordingly,
from (15), we can write ￿￿
t = ￿￿
t(nt￿1;￿t(w)), as the function that pins down the optimal ￿t,
given nt￿1 and the initial wealth distribution ￿t(w). (Recall, once again, that nt￿1 determines
nt which in turn determines rt; hence we can write rt as a function of nt￿1).
The operator ￿t [￿] maps the initial wealth distribution prevailing in period t into the initial
wealth distribution holding in t+1, based on the transition equations speci￿ed above. Notice that
this operator changes over time, since the transition equations and their associated occurrence
probabilities both depend on the value of nt. Additionally, the dynamic behaviour of nt is
a⁄ected by ￿t(w) through (15). These two features of the dynamic system described by (13)
and (14) make it non-stationary and highly complicated to study. However, the most important
general results can be proven without much di¢ culty.
Lemma 5 (i) Consider two di⁄erent initial wealth distributions ￿t(w) and ￿0
t(w), and suppose
￿t(w) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates ￿0






(ii) Consider two economies (A and B) with identical initial wealth distribution, i.e. ￿A
t (w) =
￿B
t (w) = ￿t(w). Suppose also that nA
t > nB
t . Then: ￿A
t+1(w) ￿ ￿B
t+1(w).
Lemma 5 (i) states that, all other things equal, wealthier economies tend to spend more
in R&D, and its underlying intuition is straightforward from Lemma 4.25 On the other hand,
Lemma 5 (ii) says that economies with a larger fraction of active sectors tend to be richer
too. The reason for this result lies in two combined e⁄ects: ￿rst, a higher nt means that more
agents are able to ￿nd a sector in which they have a comparative advantage, increasing the
25Notice that given the shape of ￿(r;w) as plotted in Figure 3, we cannot say much about the e⁄ect of higher
moments of ￿t(w) on ￿
￿
t. In particular, since ￿(r;w) has initially a convex segment (with respect to w), followed
by a concave segment, the e⁄ect on ￿
￿
t of subjecting ￿t(w) to a mean-preserving spread is ambiguous.
26average productivity in the economy; second, a higher nt leads to the provision of better credit
contracts, spurring entrepreneurial investment. Lemma 5 thus formally proves that introducing
wealth dynamics into the model (through bequests motives) reinforces the dynamics that have
been described before in Section 5.




t);0), and let ￿e w (￿0) denote the degenerate distribution function in which wi = e w
(wi = 0) for all i 2 [0;1]. Then:
(i) If nt￿1 > ￿ n, nt will converge monotonically to n1 = 1, regardless of ￿t(w).
(ii) Suppose ￿t(w) = ￿e w. Then, there exists ￿ ne w < ￿ n such that if nt￿1 > ￿ ne w, nt will converge
monotonically to n1 = 1
(iii) Suppose ￿0 ￿ ￿t(w) ￿ ￿e w. Then, 9 ￿ n￿(w) 2 [￿ ne w; ￿ n] such that if nt￿1 > ￿ n￿(w), nt will
converge monotonically to n1 = 1. Furthermore, consider ￿t(w) ￿ ￿0
t(w), then ￿ n￿(w) ￿ ￿ n￿0(w).
Proposition 4 ￿rstly shows that the main result in Proposition 3 still holds true when we
incorporate standard wealth dynamics into the model ￿when nt is su¢ ciently large, the econ-
omy embarks in a process of long-run development, regardless of the wealth distribution in t.
Secondly, it shows that initial wealth acts as a partial substitute for nt. This last result stems
from the fact that both nt and wt contribute to alleviate adverse selection problems in the credit
market. Notice that Proposition 4 (ii) and (iii) imply that the minimum degree of sectoral
variety needed to guarantee long-run growth turns out to be smaller the richer the economy is.
This result can be interpreted as saying that the importance of sectoral diversi￿cation as a factor
improving the operation of ￿nancial markets is relatively higher at initial stages of development,
and tends to decrease as the economy develops and becomes wealthier.
7 Further Discussion: Some Stylised Facts in the Data
This section discusses some empirical patterns and observations that are consistent with the
main predictions of the model. In particular, it focuses on three main predictions of the model
and it poses the following questions:
(i) Does the variety of sectors grow along the path of development? In addition, is sectoral
diversi￿cation more pronounced at early stages of development (as Section 6 would suggest)?
(ii) Are sectoral diversi￿cation and ￿nancial deepening positively correlated? In addition, does
the magnitude of this correlation change as development progresses (as Section 6 would suggest)?
27(iii) As the economy grows and the variety of sectors expands, does income volatility decline as
the improved allocation of talents would predict?
7.1 Sectoral Diversi￿cation and Development
The key anecdotal observation that motivates this paper and, at the same time, one of the main
predictions of the model is that the variety of sectors increases as economies grow and develop.
For a panel of 67 countries, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) show that sectoral concentration (the
opposite of sectoral diversi￿cation) drastically falls at early stages of development, following
a U-shaped relationship with respect to income per head.26 They conclude that, along the
development path, economies initially experience a long process of sectoral diversi￿cation, which
eventually reaches a maximum beyond where the process begins to revert.
Figure 4, which relies on Imbs and Wacziarg￿ s dataset, presents an overview of the associ-
ation between sectoral diversi￿cation and income per head. (See also ￿gures 1, 2 and 3 in their
paper, p. 69.) Sectoral concentration is measured by their Gini coe¢ cients for employment
shares based on the UNIDO 3-digit dataset; a smaller Gini coe¢ cient thus re￿ ects a more di-
versi￿ed economy in terms of manufacturing industries. Income per head is measured by GDP
per capita in thousands of PPP 1985 US dollars (from Summers and Heston (1991)).
To allow for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship, I run a ￿fth-order polynomial
regression. I also show the results of a quadratic regression. Both regressions additionally control
for country ￿xed e⁄ects. We can observe the pattern described in Imbs and Wacziarg: sectoral
concentration initially decreases with income, eventually reaching a turning point beyond which
the relationship partially reverts.
Given the implications of the model, two key observations need to be stressed here: (i) the
turning point in the diversi￿cation process tends to occur at relatively high levels of income per
capita (the authors argue that this point is located roughly at the income per head of Ireland
in 1992); (ii) the eventual re-concentration process only partly o⁄sets the e⁄ect of the initial
diversi￿cation phase.
26Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use the non-parametric lowess technique to capture the association between sectoral
concentration and income per capita. They build ￿ve di⁄erent concentration indices based on employment shares
(Gini coe¢ cient, Her￿ndahl index, log-variance of sector shares, coe¢ cient of variation, and the max-min spread).
These indices are constructed for three di⁄erent datasets: 1-digit level (9 sectors) from the International Labor
O¢ ce (ILO), 3-digit level (28 sectors) from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO),
and 2-digit level (20 sectors) from the OECD. For the UNIDO and OECD datasets, value added per sector is also
available and utilized. All their results are robust to the use of di⁄erent indices and datasets.
28Figure 4: Sectoral Concentration and Income Per Head.
The Gini coe¢ cient in the picture measures the degree of sectoral concentration in the economy in terms of
employment shares across 28 manufacturing sectors (3-digit level disaggregation, UNIDO dataset).
7.1.1 The Non-monotonic Diversi￿cation Path
One of the most interesting ￿ndings in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) is the non-monotonic rela-
tionship between income and sectoral diversi￿cation. Although, strictly speaking, this paper
does not predict such non-monotonic relationship, the results presented in Section 6 can yet
help shedding some light on the possible reasons leading to this non-monotonicity. In particular,
that section has shown that sectoral variety is most relevant to alleviate informational frictions
at early stages of development. As the economy grows and accumulates wealth, the use of col-
lateral can substitute for the improved self-selection of skills allowed by sectoral variety. As a
consequence, if there exist also gains from regional specialisation (such as increasing returns to
scale), at some point in the development path, economies might ￿nd it worthwhile to sacri￿ce
some degree of sectoral variety in order to better exploit increasing returns to scale, leading to
a non-monotonic path as that in Figure 4.
297.2 Financial Development and Sectoral Diversi￿cation in the Data
Another important prediction of the model is the positive feedback between the degree of sectoral
diversi￿cation and the level of development of ￿nancial markets. This feedback implies that those
two variables should display positive correlation in cross-country data.
In this subsection, I present some evidence of this correlation for an unbalanced panel of
countries during years 1975-92. I consider three di⁄erent indicators traditionally used in the
literature of ￿nancial deepening and growth: 1) the logarithm of the ratio of private credit by
￿nancial institutions to GDP, Log(Credit/GDP); 2) the logarithm of the ratio of stock market
capitalisation to GDP, Log(SMK/GDP); 3) the logarithm of the ratio of stock market value
traded to GDP, Log(SMVT/GDP).27 To measure the degree of sectoral concentration, I follow
again Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and use the Her￿ndahl indices for the employment shares across
the 28 manufacturing sectors in the UNIDO 3-digit dataset.28 The summary statistics in Table
2 indicate that there is substantial variation in the variables.
In columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 3, each of the ￿nancial development indicators is
regressed against the sectoral concentration index. Each of the regression equations additionally
controls for country ￿xed-e⁄ects and GDP per capita. Country ￿xed-e⁄ects are included so as
to track individual economies over their own path of development. GDP per head controls for
the fact that ￿nancial indicators and sectoral diversi￿cation might be moving together just as
consequence of income shocks a⁄ecting both variables simultaneously.
From columns (1) and (3) we can observe that the estimated coe¢ cient for the Her￿ndahl
exhibits the expected negative sign, being also signi￿cant. According to those two regressions,
sectoral diversi￿cation is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with ￿nancial development within
each country, even after controlling for the possibility of common income shocks.
When the stock market value traded to GDP ratio is used as a proxy for ￿nancial development
in column (5), the estimate turns out to be insigni￿cant and displays the opposite sign. In
that regard, it can be argued that the ratio of credit to GDP and the ratio of stock market
27All data on ￿nancial indicators is taken from Beck et al (1999). Refer to this paper for a detailed description
of those indicators.
28The reason why we are using here the Her￿ndahl instead of the Gini to measure sectoral concentration is that
the former displays more variability than the latter, so it permits a more precise estimation of the coe¢ cients
in Table 3. In particular, the coe¢ cient associated to the interaction term in Table 3 cannot be precisely
estimated if using the Gini, while this is not the case if using the Her￿ndahl. To have an idea of the problem, the
correlation between the interaction term (Y ￿ Gini) and Y is 0.98, while the correlation between (Y ￿ Her￿ndahl)
and Y is 0.74.
30capitalisation to GDP are better proxies for the level of ￿nancial development than the ratio of
stock market value traded to GDP, which seems more to account for the liquidity of the stock
market rather than for the size of it.
Section 6 has shown that the wealth e⁄ect operates in the same direction as an expanding
variety of sectors. Therefore, for a given degree of diversi￿cation, richer economies would tend
to su⁄er from less severe adverse selection, displaying accordingly higher ￿nancial development.
This implies that sectoral diversi￿cation should play a more important role in poorer economies
compared to richer ones. In order to capture evidence consistent with the presence of this
e⁄ect, regressions (2), (4) and (6) in Table 3 additionally include an interaction term between
the log of GDP per head and the degree of sectoral concentration, Y ￿ Her￿ndahl. All the
estimates for the interaction term display the expected positive sign, being also highly signi￿cant.
Furthermore, in column (6), including the interaction term turns the coe¢ cient associated to
the Her￿ndahl index negative, as predicted by the model (although it still remains statistically
insigni￿cant).29
Lastly, the results in Table 3 only aim at eliciting a positive correlation between sectoral
diversi￿cation and ￿nancial development, even after controlling for some additional covariates. A
stronger result is present in Ramcharan (2006), who shows a positive and signi￿cant causal e⁄ect
of sectoral diversi￿cation on ￿nancial deepening, using countries￿topographical characteristics
to instrument for diversi￿cation.
Dependent Variable: Log(Cred/GDP) - 1212 observations Dependent Variable: Log(SMK /GDP) - 484 observations
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Log(Credit/GDP) -1.346 -1.275 1.194 -15.12 0.554 Log(SMKT/GDP) -2.123 -2.028 1.377 -7.13 0.339
Log Income per head 1.33 1.40 0.98 -1.24 3.00 Log Income per head 1.72 1.83 0.81 -0.15 2.90
Herfindahl Index 0.118 0.086 0.098 0.060 0.877 Herfindahl Index 0.092 0.079 0.055 0.060 0.450
Dependent Variable: Log(SMVT/GDP) - 534 observations Note: Log income per head equal to -1.24 corresponds to income per head 290
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max in 1985 PPP US dollars (this is the income per head in PPP of Ethiopia in 1967).
Log(SMVT/GDP) -4.065 -3.719 2.103 -10.78 1.867 Log income per head equal to 2.90 corresponds to income per head 18,095
Log Income per head 1.74 1.85 0.78 -0.21 2.90 in 1985 PPP US dollars (this is the income per head in PPP of US in 1989).
Herfindahl Index 0.087 0.077 0.042 0.060 0.423
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics
29Using ￿ve-year intervals for the ￿xed-e⁄ects regressions does not signi￿cantly alter the pointwise estimates
reported in Table 3, although their precision naturally falls due to the lower number of observations. The results
are also quite robust to the inclusion of a linear time trend on the level of ￿nancial development (the coe¢ cient
on the time trend is always positive and signi￿cant). These results are available from the author upon request.
31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sectoral Concentration -0.783*** -1.122*** -3.45* -4.19** 5.78 -1.164
(Herfindahl) (0.285) (0.294) (1.93) (1.93) (3.84) (3.11)
Log Income per head (Y) 0.841*** 0.627*** 2.89*** 2.10*** 4.66*** 2.85***
(0.047) (0.062) (0.19) (0.34) (0.363) (0.673)
Y · Herfindahl 1.924*** 8.00*** 19.39***
(interaction term) (0.421) (2.62) (5.74)
R squared (within) 0.21 0.23 0.42 0.44 0.29 0.30
Obs. / Countries 1212 / 57 1212 / 57 484 / 36 484 / 36 534 / 40 534 / 40
Note: robust standard errors parentheses. All regressions include an intercept and country fixed-effects.
Regressions are run on an unbalanced panel during 1975-92. Log(SMVT/GDP) is the log of Stock Market Value Traded to GDP.
Log(Cred/GDP) is the logarithm of Total Private Credit to GDP. Log(SMK/GDP) is the log of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP.
Log Income per head is the log of GDP per head in PPP in 1,000 of 1985 US dollars from Summers and Heston (1991).
The Herfindahl coefficients are based on the UNIDO 3-digit employment dataset from Imbs and Wacziarg (2003)
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
TABLE 3: Sectoral Diversification and Financial Development
Independent Variable Log(Credit/GDP) Log(SMK/GDP)
Dependent Variable
Log(SMVT/GDP)
7.3 Allocation of Talent, Growth and Income Volatility
One other main prediction of the model is that the allocation of skills improves during the
process of development. This feature is consistent with the evidence that income volatility falls
as output per capita rises documented, for example, by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997, section II).
Even more compelling for the prediction of improved allocation of talents, is the cross-country
evidence using sectoral data in Koren and Tenreyro (2007). They point out that a signi￿cant
part of the volatility di⁄erential between rich and poor countries is due to lower volatility within
sectors in the former compared to the later.30 This is exactly what the model predicts. More
precisely, as the variety of activities expands, allowing improved matching of skills to activities,
the sectoral failure risk should decline accordingly. In other words, better assignment of skills
translates into a higher rate of entrepreneurial success, which in turn reduces output volatility
within sectors (and, as a consequence, in the aggregate economy too).
The model then predicts that income volatility within activities (or ￿rms) decreases during
30Koren and Tenreyro (2007), page 271, estimate that between 40% and 41% of the di⁄erence in total income
volatility between countries in the top 5 percentile versus those in the bottom 5 percentile is attributable to what
they call idiosyncratic sectoral risk. This component captures the volatility of a speci￿c sector in a speci￿c country
(for example, if apparel is particularly volatile in country x but not in country z, this will be re￿ ected in this
component, after weighting that volatility by the employment share in the apparel industry in each country).
32development. This di⁄ers from Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), where volatility within activities
actually rises over the process of development because agents choose to take on larger risks
when they have access to more e¢ cient ￿nancial markets. More signi￿cantly, my paper predicts
that an exogenous increase in the variety of sectors (for example after a countries open up to
trade) would lead to lower income variability within sectors, which would in turn lower the
cost of ￿nancial intermediation and expand ￿nancial transactions. Therefore, lower volatility
might arise purely as the result of technological diversi￿cation, and without any (exogenous)
improvements in the ￿nancial markets. This is in line with the evidence in Koren and Tenreyro
(2008), who found that the negative correlation between volatility and development takes place
at all levels of ￿nancial deepening.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a theory in which the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial markets is a key condition
for growth and development. I have suggested that an expanding variety may be an important
factor leading to ￿nancial development. In particular, this theory has stressed a side e⁄ect
associated with the innovation process that had not been explored before, but which could exert
a signi￿cant impact on development. Innovation activities can lead to a reduction of frictions
in the ￿nancial markets and foster ￿nancial development, because by expanding the variety of
productive activities, they concomitantly facilitate the allocation of skills, alleviating adverse
selection problems.
The core model that illustrates this theory has made use of several simplifying assumptions.
One assumption that may seem particularly worrying is the fact that individuals are born with
no initial wealth. In that regard, Section 6 has shown that none of the model￿ s main ￿ndings
would be a⁄ected if we let agents be born with positive wealth. Despite not altering its main
results, introducing wealth may carry some interesting additional implications within a more
general model. Imagine that we gave room for increasing returns to scale and international
trade. If sectoral diversi￿cation really matters as a mechanism to solve adverse selection only
at early stages of development (as suggested by Section 6), then in the presence of increasing
returns and trade, at some point in the development path, economies might ￿nd it worthwhile to
reverse the diversi￿cation tendency and start re-specialising in some speci￿c sectors. This feature
would in fact be consistent with the evidence found by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), providing a
sound explanation for the non-monotonic relation between sectoral diversi￿cation and income
33per head shown initially in Figure 4.
Another feature that deserves further discussion is the behaviour of ￿nancial intermediaries.
In the model, ￿nanciers respond "passively" to the environment. However, it can be argued
that the operation of the ￿nancial system improves during development not only because fric-
tions are alleviated, but also because the screening capacity of the ￿nanciers gets better. The
paper has abstracted from the latter mechanism. One remark concerning this omission is worth
noting, though. The amount of screening e⁄ort is an endogenous choice, and it will certainly
be in￿ uenced by the cost of screening. This paper states that screening e⁄ort is eased by sec-
toral variety, as this allows heterogeneous agents to self-select better. However, this does not
necessarily imply that richer economies should conduct less credit screening than poorer ones.
In fact, as sectoral variety decreases the cost of screening, in some cases, more screening e⁄ort
could be the optimal response by lenders to the new environment, rather than simply denying
credit so as to avoid the screening cost fully.
From a policy perspective, an important implication concerns poverty-alleviation programmes.
Section 5 has shown that some economies might get stuck in a peculiar type of poverty trap.
This is the result of a "deep-rooted" organisational failure, a⁄ecting several markets at the same
time. Underdevelopment is characterised by few sectors in which individuals can specialise,
ine¢ cient ￿nancial markets, and scant innovation activities. The market failure contaminating
the operation of the economy stems from the incapacity of some individuals to ￿nd an activity
for which they are comparatively talented. Most theories on poverty traps imply that economies
can be easily rescued from poverty by receiving a su¢ ciently large wealth transfer. In con-
trast, my theory suggests that foreign aid should presumably also include important transfers
of technology and know-how, as standard wealth transfers alone might not su¢ ce to suppress
the adverse selection problem (at least in a reasonably short time frame).
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Take two di⁄erent credit contracts (l￿;r￿) 2 R+￿R+ and (~ l; ~ r) 2 R+￿R+
, such that f0(k = l￿) ￿ 1 and f0(k = ~ l) ￿ 1.31 Hence, in equilibrium, all the amount that is
borrowed will be invested in the entrepreneurial projects. Accordingly, let￿ s denote: k￿ = l￿ and
31It must be straightforward to notice that entrepreneurs only borrow in order to ￿nance entrepreneurial
investment. Therefore, in equilibrium, they would never borrow beyond the point f
0(k) = 1.
34~ k = ~ l. Assume that:
f(k￿) ￿ (1 + r￿)k￿ > f(~ k) ￿ (1 + ~ r)~ k (L.1.1)
Then, from (L.1.1), if type i decides to specialise in sector i 2 A, he will prefer contract (k￿;r￿)
to contract (~ k; ~ r).
Take now type j. Since sector j = 2 A, he will specialise (indi⁄erently) in any sector h 2 [0;1],
such that sector h 2 A. Given limited liability, type j will (weakly) prefer contract (~ k; ~ r) to
contract (k￿;r￿), if and only if:
p[f(~ k) ￿ (1 + ~ r)~ k] ￿ p[f(k￿) ￿ (1 + r￿)k￿] (L.1.2)
But, since p > 0, (L.1.2) contradicts (L.1.1). Hence, it cannot be true that, while type i prefers
contract (k￿;r￿) to contract (~ k; ~ r), type j prefers (~ k; ~ r) to (k￿;r￿) instead. Finally, since (~ k; ~ r)
and (k￿;r￿) can be any credit contracts; whenever type i prefers (k￿;r￿) to (~ k; ~ r), then type
j also prefers (k￿;r￿) to (~ k; ~ r), and no equilibrium can possibly encompass separating credit
contracts among those two types. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. The expression in (6) follows from the previous discussion in Section
3.2. Then, di⁄erentiating (6) with respect to nt: dr￿
t=dnt = ￿(1 ￿ p)[nt + (1 ￿ nt)p]
￿2 < 0: ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume that the inventor i 2 [0;1] alive in t expends ￿i units of e⁄ort. If
he manages to generate a new idea, then from Lemma 2 it should be straightforward that he will
optimally charge a price equal to ￿(r￿
t) to transfer the idea (to the type i) - this is the maximum
price the inventor i could charge, while the type i is still willing to buy the new idea. Making
use of Proposition 1, we can write ￿(r￿








￿t. Since active sectors in t ￿ 1 never revert to inactive in t, and
recalling (9), then:





Notice that, because ￿(
_
￿t) is bounded away from 1, (L.3.1) implies ￿(￿) is increasing in both
nt￿1 and
_





￿t). From where it follows that: (i) ￿0
n = e ￿0(nt)(1 ￿ ￿(
_
￿t))nt￿1 > 0; (ii) ￿0
￿ ￿ =
e ￿0(nt)(1 ￿ nt￿1)￿0(
_
￿t), which leads to ￿0
￿ ￿ > 0 if nt￿1 2 [0;1) and ￿0
￿ ￿ = 0 if nt￿1 = 1.
Finally, noting that having exerted e⁄ort ￿i, inventor i will succeed in generating a new idea
with probability ￿(￿i), we may write: ￿i;t(￿i;nt￿1;
_
￿t) = ￿(￿i) ￿ ￿(nt￿1;
_
￿t) ￿ ￿i; which is the
expression stipulated in Lemma 3. ￿
35Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1). Consider two values of nt￿1; n0;n1 2 [0;1], such that










￿t ￿ 0. Finally, suppose ￿￿
0 > ￿￿
1.

















￿t), which contradicts ￿0
nt￿1 > 0 for all
_
￿t ￿ 0 proved in
Lemma 3. Consequently, n0 < n1 ) ￿￿
0 ￿ ￿￿
1.



















￿b); where nt￿1 2 [0;1]. Finally, suppose ￿￿
a < ￿￿

















￿b), which contradicts ￿0
￿ ￿ > 0 for all nt 2 [0;1) (and
￿0







Proof of Corollary 1. (i) Since, from Lemma 3, ￿0
n(￿) > 0, setting
_
￿t = 0 we obtain:
￿0(0)￿(nt￿1;0) ￿ ￿0(0)￿(￿ n;0) = 1, 8nt￿1 ￿ ￿ n. (C.1.1)
Thus, given ￿00(￿) < 0 and the conditions stated in (10), (C.1.1) entails that ￿￿
i = 0 must




n(￿) > 0, it follows that:
￿0(0)￿(nt￿1;0) > ￿0(0)￿(￿ n;0) = 1, 8nt￿1 > ￿ n: (C.1.2)
Therefore, given ￿00(￿) < 0, (C.1.2) implies that ￿￿
i > 0 must necessarily hold for any nt￿1 > ￿ n
when
_




￿t) ￿ ￿0(0)￿(nt￿1;0) > ￿0(0)￿(￿ n;0) = 1, 8nt￿1 > ￿ n and
_
￿t > 0.
Hence, in order to comply with (10), ￿￿
i > 0 must hold for all nt￿1 > ￿ n and
_
￿t ￿ 0. ￿
Proof of Corollary 2. Since ￿0 _





￿t ￿ 0 and nt￿1 2 [0;1]. As a result, if ￿0(0)￿(n;1) = 1, it must be the case that:
￿0(￿i)￿(nt￿1;
_
￿t) ￿ ￿0(0)￿(nt￿1;1) ￿ 1, 8nt￿1 ￿ ￿ n; and ￿i;
_
￿t > 0. (C.2.1)
36Thus, given (10), from (C.2.1) it follows ￿￿
i = 0 must hold for all nt￿1 ￿ n and
_
￿t ￿ 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Take an economy in which n0 ￿ ￿ n and focus on equilibrium
t = 1. Given Assumption 1, Corollary 1 implies there must exist a SNE for the inventors game in
which ￿￿
1 = 0. On the other hand, Assumption 3 entails that this SNE is unique. Since ￿(0) = 0,
then (11) implies that n1 = n0 ￿ ￿ n. As a result, in t = 2 conditions for the inventors game
remain identical as they were at t = 1; thus, ￿￿
2 = 0 represents again the unique SNE in t = 2.
Repeating the same argument ad in￿nitum, it follows that: nt = n0 8t ￿ 0 and ￿￿
t = 0 8t > 0.
(ii) Take an economy where n0 > ￿ n and focus on t = 1. Given Assumption 1, Corollary 1 implies
that ￿￿
1(n0;0) > 0. As a result, there must necessarily exist a SNE for the inventors game in
t = 1 in which ￿￿
1 > 0. Given Assumption 3, then this ￿￿
1 > 0 represents the unique SNE. Since
￿￿
1 > 0, from (11) it follows that n1 = n0 + ￿(￿￿
1)(1 ￿ n0); hence, n1 > n0. In particular, this
leads to n1 > n0 > ￿ n. Proposition 2 then implies that ￿￿
2 > ￿￿
1 > 0. As a result of this, n2 > n1.
Repeating this argument ad in￿nitum, we can observe that: ￿ n < n0 < n1 < n2 < ::: < n1.
Furthermore, since ￿(￿￿
t)(1￿nt￿1) ! 0 as nt ! 1, and because ￿(￿￿
t)(1￿nt￿1) is bounded away
from zero for any nt￿1 2 [0;1) and ￿￿
t > 0; then it follows that lim
t!1
nt = 1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. Available from the author upon request.





￿(rt;w)d￿t(w) = 1: (L.5.1)
Since rt is a decreasing function of nt, and nt is an increasing function of nt￿1 for all nt￿1 2 [0;1);





￿(nt￿1;w)d￿t(w) = 1; (L.5.2)
where @￿=@nt￿1 > 0 for all nt￿1 2 [0;1), and @￿=@w = @￿=@w ￿ 0 (Lemma 4). As











(ii) We need to prove the following: for all w ￿ 0, and for all nA;nB 2 [0;1], such that nA > nB:






; where P(w;[0;x] j n) denotes the probability
that when wt = w, then wt+1 2 [0;x], conditional on nt = n.
37Step 1: Suppose w 2 [0; b w(r)). Let y(nt;wt) ￿ ￿ [f(k￿
P(rt)) ￿ (1 + rt)(k￿
P(rt) ￿ wi;t)]; where
the fact that r￿
t = r(nt) is taken into account when de￿ning y(￿). Notice that @y=@nt > 0 and





1 if y(n;w) < x
0 otherwise
: (L.5.3)
Notice that, because @y=@n > 0, then the following two properties hold: 1) Iy(nA;w)<x = 1 )
Iy(nB;w)<x = 1; 2) Iy(nB;w)<x = 0 ) Iy(nA;w)<x = 0. Hence, if Iy(nB;w)<x 6= Iy(nA;w)<x, it must














(1 ￿ p)nA + p
￿
Iy(nA;w)<x + (1 ￿ p)(nA ￿ nB):
Hence, if Iy(nA;w)<x = 0, the right-hand side in (L.5.4) yields a strictly positive number.







for all w 2 [0; b w(r)).
Step 2: Suppose w ￿ b w(r). First, note that either if ￿ [f(k￿
S(w)) ￿ k￿
S(w) + w] < x when w 2
[b w(r); e w], or if ￿ [f(k￿
G) ￿ k￿







= 1. Second, when the opposite results hold, three di⁄erent cases may arise:
Case 1: ￿ (w ￿ k￿







Case 2: ￿ [f(k￿
B) ￿ k￿
B + w] > x and ￿ (w ￿ k￿







= (1 ￿ p)(nA ￿ nB) > 0.
Case 3: ￿ [f(k￿
B) ￿ k￿
B + w] < x and ￿ (w ￿ k￿







= (nA ￿ nB) > 0.







for all w ￿ b w(r)) as well. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Let ￿ denote the set of all feasible distribution functions ￿(w).
Suppose ￿t(w) = ￿0. Since nt￿1 > ￿ n, then ￿￿
t > 0. Furthermore, since ￿t(w) ￿ ￿0 for any
￿t(w) 2 ￿, then from Lemma 5 (i) it follows that: ￿￿
t > 0 for any ￿t(w) 2 ￿. Therefore,
nt > nt￿1 > ￿ n, implying, in turn, that ￿￿
t+1 > 0 for any ￿t+1(w) 2 ￿. Repeating the same
argument ad in￿nitum, the claimed result obtains. ￿
(ii) When nt￿1 = ￿ n, we have that ￿0(0)￿(￿ r;0) = 1; where ￿ r = r￿(￿ n). Thus, ￿￿
t(￿ n;￿0) = 0.
Furthermore, from (15) notice that ￿￿
t(￿ n;￿e w) is the solution to:
￿0(￿￿
t(￿ n;￿e w))￿(r￿(nt); e w) = 1, where nt = ￿ n + (1 ￿ ￿ n)￿(￿￿
t(￿ n;￿e w)) (P.4.1)
38From Lemma 4, and the fact that r￿(nt) ￿ ￿ r, it follows that ￿(r￿(nt); e w) > ￿(￿ r;0). Therefore,
to comply with (P.4.1), ￿￿
t(￿ n;￿e w) > 0 must hold. As a result, there must exist ￿ ne w < ￿ n, such that
￿￿
t(￿ ne w;￿e w) > 0 and ￿ n = ￿ ne w + (1 ￿ ￿ ne w)￿(￿￿
t(￿ ne w;￿e w)); from which it follows that if nt￿1 > ￿ ne w
when ￿t(w) = ￿e w, then nt will grow over time, converging monotonically to n1 = 1. ￿
(iii) From Lemma 4 (i), it follows that: ￿￿
t(￿ n;￿t(w)) ￿ 0 and ￿￿
t(￿ ne w;￿t(w)) ￿ ￿￿
t(￿ ne w;￿e w). As
a result, there must exist ￿ n￿(w) 2 [￿ ne w; ￿ n], such that ￿￿






; from which it follows that if nt￿1 > ￿ n￿(w) when ￿t(w) holds, then
nt will grow over time, converging monotonically to n1 = 1. Finally, applying Lemma 4 (i)
again ￿￿
t(￿ n￿(w);￿t(w)) ￿ ￿￿
t(￿ n￿(w);￿0
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